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Valuing Water Quality Monitoring:
A Contingent Valuation Experiment
Involving Hypothetical and
Real Payments
Michael A. Spencer, Stephen K. Swallow, and Christopher J. Miller
This paper studies the preferences and willingness-to-pay of individuals for volunteer water
quality monitoring programs. The study involves supporting water quality monitoring at two
ponds in the state of Rhode Island. The paper uses both a hypothetical and a real-payment
contingent valuation survey to directfy measure individual preferences and willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for volunteer water quality monitoring at the two ponds. The overall results of the
study suggest that hypothetical WTP is not statistically greater than real WTP, and that the
average survey respondent is willing to support water quality monitoring on one of the two
ponds. The study also finds that the specified purpose of water quality monitoring and certain
socioeconomic characteristics of a respondent significantly affect the respondent’s decision to
support volunteer water quality monitoring.
Since passage of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act (FWPCA) of 1972, water quality has im-
proved in some U.S. water bodies (Freeman 1990).
Clean water yields positive dividends in terms of
ecosystem health, quality of life for humans, and
economic prosperity (U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency 1995). Federal, state, and local gov-
ernments have enacted environmental policies and
programs to meet the regulatory requirements of
the FWPCA, as well as the regulatory requirements
of the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Ocean
Dumping Act, Economic analysis of the potential
benefits associated with these policies and pro-
grams has focused on valuing the benefits of water
quality improvements, such as the associated rec-
reational benefits (Bockstael, McConnell, and
Strand 1989; Freeman 1995; Needelman and Kealy
The authors are, respectively, graduate research assistrmt, associate pro-
fessor, and graduate research assistmrt, Department of Environmental
and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island.
The authors gratefully thank Linda Green, program director of Uni-
versity of Rhode Island Watershed Watch, for helping them establisb
real, potential, “adopt-a-pond” water qrratity monitoring programs for
ttrk economics experiment. Susan Jaacart, M]ke McGonagle, and Ed
Watusiak provided valuable assistance during the experiment, Fbrarrcial
support from the USDA Higher Education Challenge Grant W6-3841 1-
2798, USDA NRI/CGP Award 96-35403-3896, U.R.L Partnership for
the Coastal Environment, and National Science Foundation/U.S. Envi-
rnnmenkd Protection Agency Partnership for Environmental Research
Grant # R825307-01-O is gratefully acknowledged. This is Rhode Island
Agricultural Experiment Station contribution no. 3567. Any errors re-
main tbe sole responsibilh y of the authors.
1995). Achieving and maintaining “good” water
quality, however, entails various costs, including
administrative, capital, labor, enforcement, and
monitoring costs, Though these costs can be quite
significant, certain costs, particularly monitoring
costs, can be reduced with volunteer help and do-
nations.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the pref-
erences and willingness-to-pay of individuals for
volunteer water quality monitoring programs. Our
study involves supporting water quality monitoring
at two ponds in the state of Rhode Island. As ex-
plained below, the two ponds differ in several re-
spects, including the purpose of water quality
monitoring. We use the contingent valuation
method (CVM) to directly measure individual
preferences and willingness-to-pay for volunteer
water quality monitoring at the two ponds.
Moreover, because previous research suggests
differences between individual hypothetical and
real willingness-to-pay (WTP) for goods and ser-
vices (Brown et al. 1996; Cummings, Harrison,
and Rutstrom 1995; Cummings et al. 1997; Loomis
et al. 1996; Neill et al. 1994; Seip and Strand
1992),1 we consider both a hypothetical and a real
payment format for our CVM study. In an experi-
1See Hanemann (1994) for a review of studies which report no sta-
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mental economic setting, we randomly assign re-
spondents to one of two groups. One group re-
ceives aCVM survey involving hypothetical pay-
ments, while the other group receives a CVM
survey involving real money, In valuing public
goods, such as water quality monitoring, incentive-
compatibility remains an issue for both payment
formats. In the hypothetical payment format, re-
spondents may overvalue their WTP if they do not
fully appreciate the financial obligations (i.e.,
costs) behind their decisions. Conversely, in the
real payment format, respondents may undervalue
their WTP if incentives to “free-ride” exist.
Efforts to address the so-called hypothetical bias
(i.e., the difference between hypothetical and real
WTP) are currently following three main direc-
tions: (1) adjusting or calibrating hypothetical
WTP (Blackburn, Harrison, and Rutstrom 1994;
Champ et al. 1997; Fox et al. 1995; Harrison et al.
1998; Shogren 1993), (2) designing hypothetical
contingent valuation surveys that yield results
similar to real payments (Cummings and Taylor
1997), and (3) developing incentive-compatible
contributions mechanisms for obtaining real-
money values, which provide more accurate refer-
ence points for assessing hypothetical bias (Ron-
deau, Poe, and Schulze 1996). The third direction
suggests that hypothetical bias will be overstated if
real-money payments are solicited with a contribu-
tions mechanism that provides little economic in-
centive to contribute to the public good. That is,
calibration of hypothetical WTP may not be
needed if real WTP is truthfully revealed,
Although all three directions remain important
to the study of hypothetical bias, we approach the
current study more in the spirit of the third direc-
tion.
Consequently, our study will interest not only
environmental agencies and citizen groups in-
volved with water quality but also researchers and
agencies interested in experimental-economic ap-
proaches to CVM (Fisher, Wheeler, and Zwick
1993; Shogren 1993). Our overall results suggest
that hypothetical WTP exceeded real WTP; how-
ever, given that our hypothetical WTP estimates
have high standard errors, we cannot conclude that
hypothetical WTP is statistically greater than real
WTP. In terms of respondent preferences for water
quality monitoring, we find that the average re-
spondent is willing to support water quality moni-
toring on one of the two ponds. We also find that
the specified purpose of water quality monitoring
and certain socioeconomic characteristics of a re-
spondent significantly affect the respondent’s de-
cision to support volunteer water quality monitor-
ing. Although our respondent sample does not per-
mit us to make inferences about the general public,
our results nevertheless may be of interest to vol-
unteer monitoring groups and environmental agen-
cies in their efforts to educate the public, recruit
new volunteers, and seek financial support.
Background on Volunteer Water
Quality Monitoring
Water quality monitoring is a key component in
efforts to protect water resources. Information pro-
vided by water quality monitoring can help iden-
tify the actual environmental impacts resulting
from pollution, detect trends in water quality, warn
of potential problems, and, at times, locate sources
of pollution and stimulate corrective action in
problem areas (Keeney 1996; U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency 1990).
Though water quality monitoring is important,
public budgets, staff size, and/or geographic scope
have represented limitations to governmental ef-
forts at state, federal, and local levels. However,
with an increasing awareness that volunteer moni-
toring programs can offer a cost-effective way to
obtain credible information on water quality, many
states are turning to volunteer programs (U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency 1990). Moreover,
volunteer water quality monitoring programs help
develop an educated and involved citizenry dedi-
cated to protecting water resources (Simpson 1991;
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1990),
In Rhode Island, volunteer water quality moni-
toring is coordinated by the University of Rhode
Island’s Watershed Watch Program. Watershed
Watch provides volunteers with both classroom
and field training, and it supplies the volunteers
with all necessary equipment. The annual cost for
water quality monitoring is $500 per water body
(Green and Gold 1993). Funding for Watershed
Watch has come from a variety of sources, includ-
ing donations by individual citizens, local citizen
associations, local and state governments, private
corporations, and nonprofit organizations (Herron
and Green 1996). The stated goals of Watershed
Watch are (1) to promote active citizen participa-
tion in water quality protection, (2) to educate the
public about water quality issues, (3) to obtain
multiyear surface water quality information both to
ascertain current conditions and to detect trends,
and (4) to encourage management programs based
upon water quality information (Green and Gold
1993, p. 1).
Currently, over 90% of Rhode Island’s data con-
cerning the conditions of its lakes and ponds is
supplied by volunteer monitors. Following struc-30 April 1998
tured weekly, biweekly, and seasonal schedules,
volunteers monitor several water quality param-
eters, including water clarity, algal density, dis-
solved oxygen, water temperature, alkalinity and
pH, nutrient levels, salts, and bacteria (Green and
Gold 1993).
Random Utility Model
Public contributions to support volunteer monitor-
ing under the University of Rhode Island Water-
shed Watch Program come in two forms: (1) do-
nations to support the general operation of Water-
shed Watch and (2) contributions to support water
quality monitoring on specific water bodies, For
the present study we focus on the second type of
contribution; that is, we investigate public prefer-
ences and WTP for volunteer monitoring on spe-
cific water bodies.
Numerous water bodies exist throughout Rhode
Island, and each water body has its own character-
istics in terms of size, water quality, location (e.g.,
near the coast versus inland), surroundings (e.g.,
rural versus urban setting), and type (e.g., lake,
pond, river, stream, or other). In modeling an in-
dividual’s preferences for water quality monitoring
on specific water bodies, we assume an individu-
al’s utility (i.e., satisfaction or happiness), Uin,as-
sociated with monitoring any particular water body
depends on the characteristics of the water body,
the socioeconomic characteristics of the individual,
and the individual’s net income after contributing
to a volunteer monitoring program on the water
body:
(1) Uin = U(X~, Sj, Mi - CJ
= V(X~, S~,fl’f~ – CJ + ‘in,
where Uin = individual i’s utility associated with
monitoring water body n; Xn = a vector of the
attribute variables (i.e., characteristics) associated
with water body n; Si = a vector of characteristics
describing individual i; kfi = individual i’s in-
come; Ci. = individual i’s required monetary con-
tribution to help support monitoring on water body
n; V(”) = the deterministic component of utility
that is econometrically measurable by the re-
searcher; and &in= the random or unobservable
component of individual i’s utility associated with
monitoring water body n.2 Since Uin contains a
random component, sin,model (1) is called a “ran-
dom utility model.”
2 Although unobservable to the researcher, &i. is known to individu-
al i.
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The establishment of water quality monitoring
on a water body depends on the collective contri-
butions of individuals. That is, Watershed Watch




where G = group size and TC = total costs of
monitoring. Our discrete-choice survey design, ex-
plained later, relies on variation in Cinamong in-
dividuals, generating a range of prices from which
to estimate average WTP.
Next, the probability that individual i will
choose to contribute to volunteer monitoring on a
particular water body is modeled as follows. First,
we define the set of available alternatives (includ-
ing the set of water bodies plus an option not to
contribute to any water body) as W.3 Individual i
will (by assumption) maximize his or her utility by
choosing alternative n if
(2) Ui~> Ui~ for all m + n in W.
Under decision rule (2), the probability that indi-
vidual i will choose alternative n is
(3) Pi(n) = Pr(Ui. > Uim,for all m # n in W),
where Pr(”) represents the probability operator.






Pi(n) = Pr(Vi~+ si, > Vim+ Ei~, for all
m+ninw)
Pi(n) = Pr(&in- ~i~ > Vim– Vin,for all
m+nin w),
where Vin = V(Xn, Sij AZi– Cin). Next, it can be
shown that if we assume the e’s are independent
and identically Type I Extreme Value distributed
in standard form, then Pi (n) can be defined as the






3In the experiment explained below, individual i faces a choice set
consisting of three alternatives: contribute to volunteer monitoring on
Pond A, contribute to volunteer monitoring on Pond B, or contribute to
neither pond, The “neither pond” alternative Wows for the possibility
that individual i either (1) receives no utility from having a pond moni-
tnred or (2) simply receives greater utility from not having a pnnd moni-
tored.Spencer, Swallow, and Miller Valuing Water Quality Monitoring 31
Estimation of model (6) requires specification of
the functional form for Vin,for all iz=W We as-





‘i(n) = ~ eXp(f3’Zim - @Ccim)’
me W
where Zin = z(Xn,S’i),~‘ is a vector of parameters,
and (3Cis the marginal utility of income, Note that
the term 13cMidrops out in estimation because it
appears in the utility function of every choice al-
ternative.5 Finally, estimates of ~‘ and (3Ccan be
obtained through maximum likelihood estimation.
Experimental Design
Our sample consisted of 140 students from three
classes at the University of Rhode Island: two
separate classes of a course entitled “Introduction
to Resource Economics” and one class from a
mixed graduate-undergraduate course entitled “In-
terdisciplinary Topics in the Coastal Environ-
merit.” The experimental sessions took place dur-
ing regular class hours, and none of the students
were forced or pressured to participate in the ex-
periment,6 Those who participated were given a
cash payment of $10.
Preliminary Procedures and Survey Materials
At the beginning of each experimental session, stu-
dent-respondents sat in rows and were verbally
told that the experiment was not a class assign-
ment, but that it would involve them in making
“real-life” decisions concerning environmental
goods. The experimenter also instructed the re-
spondents to remain quiet and not to communicate
with other respondents during the experiment.
Next, the respondents were randomly split into two
groups. Respondents were asked, row-by-row, to
count-off 1,2,3, 4, . . . .Then, by the flip of a coin,
either even or odd numbered respondents were
4 A linear form is computationally convenient turd may be interpreted
as a first-order approximation to a general utility function. Nonlinear
functional forms were not found superior in the data nnalysis discussed
below.
s Interaction terms involving M,, however, will not drop out. In our
data analysis, we investigated several terms involving income interacted
with alternative specific dummies (i.e., constants) and the individual
required contribution, but none of the terms added explanatory power to
our models.
6Only one student opted to leave, citing physical illness.
escorted to another classroom; these respondents
were assigned to the hypothetical-money survey,
while the respondents remaining in the original
classroom participated in the real-money survey. In
order to control for interrespondent communica-
tion and to give each respondent some privacy
while making decisions, respondents in both class-
rooms were separated by at least one desk space.
After the respondents were separated into differ-
ent classrooms, each respondent, in both groups,
was given a survey and a ten-dollar cash payment
in an unsealed envelope. The survey contained four
sections. The introduction summarized various as-
pects of volunteer water quality monitoring in
Rhode Island, including its role in environmental
protection, its alternative funding sources, who
volunteers in Rhode Island, and what the volun-
teers do, Part A asked respondents about their rec-
reational use of water bodies and contained several
attitudinal questions related to water quality and
water quality monitoring. The questions in Part A
were primarily used to motivate respondents to
think about what water quality monitoring means
to them, personally, Part B presented two “adopt-
a-pond” scenarios in Rhode Island, followed by a
trichotomous choice question that elicited a re-
spondent’s preference and willingness-to-pay for
water quality monitoring at either pond. Part C
contained standard demographic and socioeco-
nomic questions.
The Adopt-a-Pond Scenarios
Through Watershed Watch, we were able to offer,
for sale, a water quality monitoring program at two
ponds in Rhode Island. At the time of this experi-
ment, neither pond was being regularly monitored;
thus, our respondents (in the real-money survey)
had a real opportunity to add one or both ponds to
Watershed Watch’s monitoring program. Specifi-
cally, each respondent was asked to evaluate
whether helshe believed it was worthwhile for himl
her to pay a specified amount so that Watershed
Watch could add one of the ponds to its monitoring
program for one year, If a respondent found it
worthwhile to “adopt a pond,” then the respon-
dent actually paid the specified contribution in the
real-money survey, whereas in the hypothetical-
money survey, a respondent simply stated his/her
preference to adopt a pond,7
7 Since we made no promises to continue monitoring beyond one year,
our focus was on obtaining the value for adding a pond to Watershed
Watch’s list of monitoring sites for the first yew only. If a respondent did
not think one year’s worth of data was helpful, tbe respondent may have
decided not to contribute to any pond.32 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
The ponds chosen for this study were Wakefield
Pond, located inland in northwestern Rhode Island,
and Melville Pond, located near Narragansett Bay
in southeastern Rhode Island, However, in order to
develop a more general model for water quality
monitoring preferences, we arbitrarily labeled
Wakefield Pond as Pond A and Melville Pond as
Pond B. Table 1 lists the general characteristics of
Ponds A and B. Pond A is relatively large (72
acres), surrounded by wooded area, with no obvi-
ous water clarity problem. In contrast, Pond B is
relatively small (5.5 acres), surrounded by housing
development, with an apparent water clarity prob-
lem.
In designing our contingent valuation survey,8
we maintained a particular interest in how an in-
dividual’s preference for water quality monitoring
might be affected by a pond’s surroundings and the
purpose of monitoring (table 1). Since water qual-
ity is directly affected by what happens on the
land’s surface, one might suspect that a pond sur-
rounded by housing development remains more
susceptible to pollution problems (e.g., urban rtm-
off) than a pond surrounded by wooded area. A
choice between monitoring a pond surrounded by
wooded area versus housing development repre-
sents a tradeoff between protecting a water re-
source in a relatively pristine/wooded area versus a
problem-prone/suburban area, This choice may
also represent a tradeoff between protecting wild-
life health versus (human) public health. As for the
purpose of monitoring, we found no economic
studies that investigated individual preferences for
water quality monitoring, let alone individual pref-
erences for specific water quality monitoring ob-
jectives.
In order to measure the effect of pond surround-
ings and the purpose of monitoring on an individu-
al’s preference for water quality monitoring, we
implemented these characteristics as variable in-
formation. That is, some respondents were not
given information on pond surroundings and the
purpose of monitoring, while other respondents
were given this information. The other pond char-
acteristics (table 1)—size, water clarity, and loca-
tion—were used to give a basic description of the
8The ovemtl development of the survey involved several steps. Fk’st,
we talked with representatives from Watershed Watch and Trout Unlim-
ited (another volunteer monitoring organization in Rhode Ishmd) to leanr
about water quality monitoring issues in general and at specific water
bodies. Next, we pretested a hypothetical-money version of the survey on
166 students from a course entitled “Introduction to Philosophy” at the
University of Rhode Island. The last page of the pretest surveys asked for
comments regarding the survey’s difficulty. Based on the pretest results
nnd comments, we shortened the survey’s introduction, and we made
some modifications to better clarify the adopt-a-pond scenarios.
Table 1. General Characteristics of Ponds
A and B
Characteristics Pond A Pond B
Size 72 acres 5.5 acres
Water clarity Good Poor
Location Inland Neor coast
Surrounded by Wooded area Housing development
Purpose of To worn of any To help find source of
monitoring problems current problem
ponds. Every respondent was given these basic de-
scriptions, which represented fixed, base informat-
ion.
In addition to the pond characteristics in table 1,
each monitoringfchoice alternative required an in-
dividual monetary contribution. The required con-
tribution for Ponds A and B never equaled each
other, and not every respondent faced the same
required contributions as other respondents.
We followed the Addelman and Kempthome
(1961) fractional factorial design method to create
nine different combinations of the variable pond
attributes: reauired contributions for Ponds A and
B, pond surr&ndings, and purposes of monitoring.
This resulted in nine versions of our trichotomous
choice question of choosing to monitor Pond A,
Pond B, or neither pond. Each respondent, how-
ever, faced only one choice question. Figure 1
shows the format of a typical trichotomous choice
question used in the surveys.
Prior to the trichotomous choice question, re-
spondents were informed that a minimum total
contribution from each of the three experimental
sessions was needed for either pond to be added to
Watershed Watch’s monitoring program. Specifi-
cally, the experimental instructions for the real-
money surveys read:
In order to add either pond to Watershed Watch’8
monitoring program, we need a certain minimum total
contribution from each of the three courses.For the
peoplein this room, the minimumtotal contribution
neededis $Y for Pond A and $Y for Pond B. If we
do@ collect$Yfor Pond A andlor$Yfor Pond B,
then anyonewhocontributedto PondA andlorPond
B willhavetheirmoneycontributionrefundedtoday.
However, if we collect $Y for Pond A and/or$Yfor
Pond B, then Pond A mxflor Pond B will becomea
candidatefor the WatershedWatch monitoringpro-
gram,conditionalon thecontributionscollectedfrom
the othercourses.
That is, if we collect the minimumfor Pond A
and/orPondB inallthreecourses,thenPondAand/or
Pond B will be addedto WatershedWatch’smoni-
toringprogram;otherwise,PondAand/orPondBwill
Q be addedto WatershedWatch’smonitoringpro-Spencer, Swallow, and Miller Valuing Water Quality Monitoring .-
Given the following choices, I would prefer to (please check only w box)
2 Pay the required 0 Pay nothing and have 0 Pay the required
contribution and neither Pond A nor B contribution and




Descrit)tion of Pond A:
Q 72 acre Pond,




. Monitoring will warn
of ~ problems.
Reauired Contribution:
You would have to pay
$15 to help find
monitoring for the year
1997.
NEITHER
POND A NOR B
I am ~ willing to pay for
water quality monitoring
for either pond A or B.
Reauired Contribution:
You would have to pay
$0 to help find




Descrirltion of Pond B:
. 5.5 acre Pond,
. Poor water clarity,




. Monitoring will help
find source of current
problem.
Reauired Contribution:
You would have to pay
$3 to help find
monitoring for the year
1997.
gramandallwhocontributedto PondA andiorPond
B will have their money contributionrefunded on
Tuesdav November 12.
Based on the choicesmade by individuals in all
three groups,it is possiblefor one, both, or neither
pondto be addedto the WatershedWatchprogram.9
The instructions for the hypothetical surveys par-
alleled the above instructions, except we added the
wording “if payments were collected today,” and
we used the words “did” and “would” instead of
“do” and “will.” More details on the experimen-
tal instructions are available from the authors upon
request.
The minimum total contributions for each ex-
Figure 1. Example of Trichotomous Choice Question
perimental session were set based on pretest infor-
mation and class size. A pretest of the survey
yielded an approximate $7.00 per person estimate
of anticipated average WTP, estimated as the sum
of required (individual) contributions times the
proportion of pretest respondents who chose a
pond at that contribution level. However, given the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion’s (1993) suggestion that hypothetical CVM
dollar values be divided by a factor of 2, we cali-
brated our estimate of anticipated WTP to $3.50.10
Next, we multiplied the (calibrated) anticipated
WTP for either pond by the anticipated number of
participants in each experimental session to derive
gThe likelihood of cross-contamination between the experimental ses-
sions was low. Session 2 began ten minutes ufter session 1.Session 3 was
run several weeks later. Most of the subjects in sessions 1 and 2 were
freshmen und sophomores, while the subjects in session 3 were juniors,
seniors, and graduate students. None of the students in sessions 1 rmd 2
were enrolled in tbe class that represented session 3. Moreover, tbe
subjects in session 3 were first asked if they had heard of the experiment.
None said yes.
10Because of different class schedules, we had tbe Opportunity to
adjust our estimate of andcipated WTP ufter our initial day of experi-
mentation. Based on the survey results from sessions 1 and 2, we ob-
tained an approximate $2.94 and $2.96 per person estimate of (culi-
bmted) arrticipated WTP for the hypothetical-money and real-money
surveys, respectively. We used these latter estimates to determine the
minimum total contributions for session 3.34 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
the minimum totrd contributions for that session,11
This approach attempted to create a situation
where the public provision of funds for water qual-
ity monitoring depended on the marginal person.
That is, if any one person actually valued monitor-
ing at or above the required (individual) contribu-
tion for a pond but chose not to contribute (i.e., to
free-ride), then the chance of raising the funds
needed to establish a monitoring program at the
pond would be low.
Incentive-Compatibility of Our
Contributions Mechanism
Standard economic theory predicts that individuals
will not voluntarily contribute to the provision of a
public good because each individual has an incen-
tive to free-ride on the contributions of others. De-
spite this prediction, one still finds that individuals
voluntarily contribute to public goods, such as
charities, public television, and wildlife conserva-
tion. Experimental tests of the ability of the vol-
untary contributions mechanism (VCM) to provide
public goods appear mixed (for an overview, see
Davis and Holt [1993, section 6,3] and Ledyard
[1995]): free-riding inhibits the ability of the VCM
to provide public goods in some scenarios, while it
does not inhibit the provision of public goods in
other scenarios. Such mixed results call into ques-
tion the incentive-compatibility of the VCM to
eliminate free-riding and truthfully reveal the de-
mand for public goods. Recently, research has
turned to the development of incentive structures
that, when added to the VCM, will significantly
reduce the free-rider problem. The voluntary con-
tributions mechanism used in this study incorpo-
rates two structures that have been shown theoret-
ically and empirically to reduce the incentive to
free-ride.
Specifically, our contributions mechanism con-
tains a provision point (PP) and a money-back
guarantee (MBG). The minimum total contribution
required for each experimental session represents a
conditional PP, whereby the provision of water
quality monitoring on a pond remains conditional
on all three groups reaching their predetermined
PPs. If the sum of the individual contributions for
a pond in any group falls short of the group’s con-
ditional PP, then anyone who contributed to that
‘1As mentioned earlier, Watershed Watch requires $500 per year to
monitor any water body (Green and Gold 1993). For the real-money
survey groups, the minimum totnl contributions required from each ex-
perimental session totaled $255 per pond, Since these funds fell short of
$500, we set aside $490 (= $245 x 2) from our budget to cover tbe
additional cost of monitoring at each pond.
pond will receive a full refund. This money-back
guarantee reduces any concern that too few contri-
butions will be collected to permit provision of the
good at the specified level, in which case respon-
dents would have incurred costs for an undeliver-
able benefit.
Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) and Davis and Holt
(1993, section 6.4) provide game-theoretic argu-
ments that show that the use of a PP with an MBG
reduces the incentive to free-ride. In fact, for
games of complete but imperfect information, free-
riding is not a sensible strategy when a PP with an
MBG exists (Bagnoli and McKee 1991). Isaac,
Schmidtz, and Walker (1989) report experimental
evidence that adding an MBG to a PP significantly
increases contribution rates. And Bagnoli and Mc-
Kee (1991) offer experimental evidence that sug-
gests a PP with an MBG provides incentives for
individuals to successfully provide a public good.
Rose et al. (1997) also offer evidence that suggests
a PP mechanism induces demand-revealing behav-
ior for public goods.
Although our contributions mechanism parallels
the basic nature of the mechanisms used in the
above studies, it is somewhat more complicated.
Participants in our study face several provision
points: a group-specific PP for each pond and an
aggregate PP for each pond, where the latter equals
the sum of the group-specific provision points, Par-
ticipants are fully informed about their group-
specific PP and the number of groups participating
in the study, but they do not know the aggregate PP
or the group-specific PP for other groups. Addi-
tionally, participants are not told the size of their
group or other groups, although nothing prevents
participants from taking a head-count of their own
group, if so desired. Incomplete information about
group size and the PP may not, however, hinder the
effectiveness of provision point mechanisms in
providing public goods (Rondeau, Schulze, and
Poe 1997).12 However, since we do not use in-
duced values and run treatments without a PP and
an MBG, we cannot test the incentive compatibil-
ity of our contributions mechanism. Here, we at-
tempt to value a real, deliverable, environmental,
public good, which precludes the use of induced
values. Rather than formally test our contributions
mechanism in an induced value framework. we
I 2 ~ondeau, fjchup~e, ~d Poe (1997) use a PP in conjuuctiOn with an
MBG and proportional rebate (PR) rale. Under the PR rule, all contri-
butions in excess of the PP are divided among, and refunded to, indi-
viduals in proportion to tbe amount of their contribution relative to tbe
totnl contributions collected in their group. Using induced values in a
laboratory experiment, the authors report high levels of aggregate de-
marrd revelation regardless of incomplete information ahout the PP or
group size,Spencer, Swallow, and Miller Valuing Wafer Quality Monitoring 35
rely more on the findings of previous laboratory
experiments to defend the incentive compatibility
of our mechanism.
Champ et al. (1997) argue that, without the use
of an incentive-compatible contributions mecha-
nism, actual voluntary donations to the provision
of a public (environmental) good represent a
“lower bound” on the value of the public good.
Given this argument in conjunction with the afore-
mentioned findings that provision point mecha-
nisms reduce free-riding behavior, we argue that
our contributions mechanism should, at least, elicit
lower bound estimates of the value for water qual-
ity monitoring on each pond in the real-money sur-
vey treatment.
Logistics of the Real-Money Survey Treatment
In addition to a survey and envelope filled with ten
dollars, respondents in the real-money survey treat-
ment received an identification card. The identifi-
cation card contained an arbitrarily assigned iden-
tification number, which also appeared on the
money envelope and the survey. We used the iden-
tification number to keep track of monetary ex-
changes while ensuring the anonymity of indi-
vidual decisions. Respondents were instructed to
keep their identification cards and use the enve-
lopes to make monetary exchanges.
For example, if a respondent chose to support
water quality monitoring on one of the ponds, the
respondent was instructed to pay the listed pro-
gram cost by placing the exact amount of money in
the envelope. Payment could be made in cash,
check (payable to Rhode Island Watershed Watch),
or partially cash and IOU. The casMOU payment
option was available only for program costs ex-
ceeding the ten-dollar participation fee, The IOU
entailed signing a promissory note that was pay-
13For convenience, a self- able within one week.
addressed stamped envelope was provided for pay-
ing an IOU.
When all the respondents finished the survey,
the experimental monitors collected all the money
envelopes and surveys; respondents who chose
neither pond handed in an empty envelope. Next,
the experimental monitors checked that each enve-
lope contained the correct cash, check, or cashl
IOU contribution required by the monitoring pro-
gram chosen by each survey respondent. If a moni-
toring program was chosen, but the envelope did
not contain the correct money contribution, then
13other “~e~ of tie IOU payment option can be found in HamisOn et
al. (1998), Loomis et al, (1996), and Neill et al. (1994).
the survey was excluded from the results.14Then
the monitors summed the valid contributions for
each monitoring program. If the sum of the indi-
vidual contributions for any program equaled or
exceeded the minimum aggregate contribution re-
quired for that experimental session, the respon-
dents were instructed to keep their identification
cards until a specified date. In this case, the
pond(s) became a candidate for the Watershed
Watch program, conditional on the contributions
collected from the other experimental sessions;
thus, the respondents needed to retain their identi-
fication cards in order to receive a future refund in
the event that the other experimental sessions
failed to contribute enough money to the monitor-
ing program. However, if the sum of the individual
contributions for any program was less than the
minimum aggregate contribution required for that
experimental session, then the respondents who
contributed to the program received a refund im-
mediately. Refunds were handled by matching
identification cards with envelopes. As each re-
spondent left the room, he or she presented his or
her identification card to an experimental monitor,
who in turn gave the respondent an envelope that
matched the number on the respondent’s identifi-
cation card. In this case, respondents who had cho-
sen not to contribute received an empty envelope
in order to avoid signaling their private decisions
to fellow participants.
Results and Discussion
Contributions Collected for Each Pond
Table 2 summarizes the hypothetical and real con-
tributions for each pond, Except for group 3 in the
real-money survey, a relatively small number of
respondents chose neither pond. A comparison of
the required group contribution versus the contri-
butions collected suggests that, in several in-
stances, the marginal person determines whether
the group reaches its target. For example, in the
hypothetical-money survey, group 2 fails to reach
the required fund for Pond B by $2. In the real-
money survey, group 3 surpasses the required fund
for Pond B by only $4, but group 1fails to raise the
required fund for Pond B by $5, and group 2 fails
to raise the required fund for Pond A by $12. All of
14@I ~ 5 out of 76 respondents in the real-moneY surveY trea~ent
neglected to make the correctmoney contribution for their chosen pond,
We exumined several approaches for including these respondents in our
analysis, None of these approaches altered our basic conclusions below,
although some numerical estimates changed slightly,36 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 2. Summary of Hypothetical and Real Contributions for Each Pond
Hypothetical-Money Survey Real-Money Survey
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Required group contribution for each pond’ $98 $77 $53 $98
Total contributions collected fop
Pond A $70 $50 $84 $40
Pond B $149 $75 $72 $93
Number of subjects who chose neither pond
(l;%Y (:%) (1:%) (1:%)
Actual sample size 30 16 18 27







‘This number represents the minimum total contribution required from each group (i.e., experimental session), for each pond.
Groups 1 and 2 represent the two undergraduate classes, and group 3 represents the interdisciplinary graduate-undergraduate class.
The required contributions are based on anticipated group sizes of 28, 22, and 18 for groups 1, 2, and 3, respectively, in the
hypothetical-money survey, and 28, 22, and 27 for groups 1, 2, and 3, respectively, in the real-money survey.
bFor the hypothetical survey, these are staterthypotheticnl contributions.
‘Numbers in parentheses represent the number of neither-pond choices as a percentage of usable surveys.
‘Some surveys were excluded from the analysis because the respondent either chose both ponds or actually contributed an
insufficient a-mount of money and IOU.
these amounts fall within the range of individual
cost variables included in the survey.
In total, the respondents in the hypothetical sur-
vey raised $204 and $296 for water quality moni-
toring on Ponds A and B, respectively. The respon-
dents in the real-money survey actually contributed
a total of $147 and $221, respectively, for Ponds A
and B. However, since the real-money respondents
failed to reach the required group contribution in
every group, each respondent received a full refund
and neither pond was added to the Rhode Island
Watershed Watch monitoring program.
Analysis of Individual Preferences
Table 3 describes all the variables used in our artaly-
sis of individual preferences for water quality morti-
toring. The SURROUND.A and SURROUND_B at-
tribute variables represent, respectively, a choice
between monitoring a pond in relatively natural
(i.e., wooded) versus nonnatural (i.e., housing
area) surroundings (table 1),The PURPOSE_A and
PURPOSE_B variables measure the effect of in-
cluding information on the purpose of monitoring,
with purposes to “warn of any problems” in Pond
A or to “help find the source of [a] current prob-
lem” in Pond B (table 1).We developed no a priori
hypothesis concerning which purpose might be im-
portant to an individual. We did, however, hypoth-
esize that the inclusion of information on the moni-
toring purpose will have a positive effect on an
individual’s probability of choosing a pond over
choosing the neither-pond option.
The required contribution/cost variable is sepa-
rated into HYPOTHETICAL COST, which equals
the respondent’s required payment for programs
chosen in the hypothetical-money surveys and
which equals zero for programs chosen in the real-
money surveys; and REAL COST, which equals the
respondent’s required payment for programs cho-
sen in the real-money surveys and which equals
zero for programs chosen in the hypothetical-
money surveys. HYPOTHETICAL COST and
REAL COST are expected to have a negative effect
on an individual’s probability of choosing a pond.
Lastly, we consider several socioeconomic vari-
ables, characterizing a respondent’s gender, aca-
demic major, residence, and attitude toward social
responsibility for water quality. We interact the
socioeconomic variables with the NEITHER
POND alternative. These interactions indicate how
the socioeconomic variables affect an individual’s
decision to choose a pond over choosing the nei-
ther-pond option. Specifically, a negative coeffi-
cient on any of the socioeconomic–NEITHER
POND interactions (table 3) indicates that a re-
spondent with a higher value for that socioeco-
nomic characteristic is more likely to choose to
monitor one of the ponds, while a positive coeffi-
cient indicates a respondent is less likely to choose
to monitor a pond.
Table 4 reports the estimation results for four
specifications of the multinominallogit model (7a
and 7b). For each specification, the Xz-statistic for
a likelihood ratio test of the model is significant at
P <0,001. Specification 1includes all the variables
from table 3, except the NEITHER POND con-
stant. As expected, the coefficients on the cost
variables are negative. The REAL COST variable is
highly significant, with P <0.001 for a one-tailedSpencer, Swallow, and Miller Valuing Water Quality Monitoring 37


















Dttmmy variable = 1 formonitoring on Pond A; = Otherwise.
Dtrrrrmy variable = 1 formonitoring on Pond B; = Otherwise,
Dtrmmy variable = 1 formonitoring on neither pond; = Otherwise.
Dtunmyvariable = 1 ifinformation onthesurroundings of Pond Misgiven;
= Otherwise.
Dmnmyvariable = 1 ifinformation onthesurroundings of Pond B is given;
= Otherwise.
Dummy variable = 1 if information onthepurpose ofmonitoring Pond A is
given; = Otherwise.
Dummy variable = 1 if information on the purpose of monitoring Pond B is
given; = O otherwise.
The required contribution/cost for an individual in the hypothetical-money
survey treatment to support monitoring on chosen pond.b
The required contribution/cost for an individual in the real-money survey
treatment to support monitoring on chosen pond.b
Discrete variable recorded as 2 = strongly agree, 1 = agree, O = neutral,
–1 = disagree, and –2 = strongly disagree with the statement:
“Everyone is responsible for water quality, even if they do not directly
use a water body. ”
Dummy variable = 1 if female; = O if mafe.
Dummy variable = 1 if ecology/environmental majord; = O otherwise.
Dummv variable = 1 if a Rhode Island resident: = O otherwise.
‘In all the choice questions, the surrounding and/or monitoring information either appeared for both ponds or did not appear at all,
bFor both the hypothetical-money and real-money survey treatments, groups 1 and 2 faced individual costs of $5, $10, or $15 for
Pond A, and $2, $7, or $12 for Pond B, Group 3 faced individual costs of $6, $11, or $14 for Pond A, and $4, $12, or $16 for
Pond B.
CThe socioeconomic variables are interacted with the NEITHER POND dummy variable.
‘Ecology/environmental majors included animal science, aquiculture and fishery technology, biology, botany, environmental
managementiscience, natural resources science, plant science, soil and water resources, wildlife biology/management, and zoology,
test, but the HYPOTHETICAL COST variable is
only significant at P <0.18 for a one-tailed test.15
Another expected result from specification 1is that
the coefficients on the monitoring variables are
positive, although a one-tailed test reveals that only
PURPOSE_B is significant (P c 0,06). This sug-
gests that respondents are more likely to support
volunteer water quality monitoring when they are
given information on the purpose of monitoring,
especially in the case of Pond B. We return to this
issue below.
The SURROUND.A and SURROUND.B vari-
ables are negative but insignificant (two-tailed P >
0,45). The insignificance of these variables sug-
15 we ~t~o ~~dma~ed ~h~ ~odel with a nonlinear/quadraric cOst stmc-
ture (Boyle 1990). This functional form, however, made no significant
improvement (P > 0.70) in our model.
Additionrdly, one might suspect that the ten-dollar pmticipation pay-
ment, given to each respondent, might produce a smatl income effect.
That is, individuals might he more willing to pay for monitoring when
the required contribution is less than or equal to ten dollars. However, by
conducting a number of attemative nested and nonnested tests, we find
no evidence for such an income effect. All tests were insignificant (P >
0.20).
gests that the respondents value volunteer water
quality monitoring, but they remain indifferent be-
tween monitoring ponds in a relatively natural ver-
sus a nonnatural setting. The alternative specific
constants, POND A and POND B, also are negative
but insignificant (two-tailed P >0.25). These nega-
tive constants would (if significant) tend to suggest
that monitoring on either pond is not preferred to
leaving both ponds unmonitored; however, a pref-
erence for monitoring at either pond depends on
the average effect of other variables that alter the
constant/intercept terms, and we see below that
respondents prefer monitoring at least one pond
(compare specifications 1 and 3, table 4).
As for the socioeconomic–NEITHER POND in-
teraction variables, all are negative and, except for
RESIDENT_N, all remain influential in the model,
although GENDER_N is significant at only the
11% level (table 4). The negative coefficient on
WQA7TITUDE_N is expected, since one would
expect people who agree that everyone is respon-
sible for water quality to be more likely to support
volunteer water quality monitoring. Similarly, the38 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 4. Estimation Results for Various Specifications of the Multinominal Logit Model
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4
Parameter Pr>lZl Parameter Pr>lZl Parameter PD-IZI Parameter PrAZl










































































-1.445 0.002 1.266 0.137
(-3.050) (1.487)
-0.043 0.249 -0.039 0.316
(-1.153) (-1.003)












Log-likelihood –1 14.299 -114.618 –121.676 –1 14.630
Xz-statistic 63.632 <0.oolb 62.995 <0.001 48.880 <0.001 62.971 <0.001
(d.f = 12) (d$ = 8) (d.f = 5) (d.$ = 7)
NOTE:Numbers in parentheses represent Z-statistics.
‘The P-values reported in this table correspond to a two-tailed test of Ho: ~ = O versus H.: ~ # O.
‘The level of significance (i,e., P-value) for the Xz-statistic.
negative coefficient on ECOLOGY_N is expected
because student-respondents in ecology/environ-
mental majors have expressed a preference to ad-
dress environmental problems as professionals,
and this attitude may correlate with a positive will-
ingness to support pond monitoring. This result is
consistent with Kuitunen and Tormala’s (1994)
finding that students with more knowledge about
nature and conservation issues are more willing to
support endangered species conservation.
The negative coefficient on GENDER_N sug-
gests that the female respondents are more likely
than the male respondents to support volunteer wa-
ter quality monitoring. Similar differences in pref-
erences between genders is noted in other studies
(Kuitunen and Tormala 1994; Swallow et al. 1994;
Day and Devlin 1996).
Finally, the insignificance of RESIDENT_N (P >
0.60, specification 1, table 4) indicates that Rhode
Island residents were not significantly more likely
than non–Rhode Island residents to support volun-
teer monitoring in their own region of residence.
Given the statistical insignificance of the ‘‘sur-
round” variables and RESIDENT_N, we reesti-
matedthe multinominallogit model (7a and 7b) with-
out these variables in specification 2 (table 4). Note
that we use the NEITHER POND constant, instead
of the POND A and POND B constants jointly.
This specification more directly measures an indi-
vidual’s preference for a pond over the neither op-
tion.16 Estimation of specification 2 results in no
substantive changes in the sign, magnitude, and
significance of the remaining variables. A likeli-
hood ratio test between specifications 1 and 2 re-
veals no statistically significant difference (X2 =
0.638,4 d.f, P > 0.95). Thus, we conclude that the
respondents value volunteer monitoring regardless
16 ~he ~~eofNEITHER POND, instead of POND A and pOND B
jointfy, imposes the restriction that respondents view these ponds as
equivalent, a priori, so that pond acreage, clarity, and location differences
(table 1) did not significantly affect respondents’ choices. The restriction
is not significant (P > 0,90).Spencer, Swallow, and Miller Valuing Water Quality Monitoring 39
of either pond’s surroundings and the respondent’s
state of residence.
Next, realizing that the socioeconomic–
NEITHER POND interaction terms may alter the
NEITHER POND constant term, we reestimated
specification 2 without the socioeconomic-
NEITHER POND interactions, using specification
3 (table 4). No major change in the cost and moni-
toring variables occurs, but the NEITHER POND
constant becomes negative and statistically signifi-
cant (P < 0.003). This suggests that the respon-
dents prefer to monitor one of the ponds over leav-
ing both ponds unmonitored. A likelihood ratio test
between specifications 2 and 3, however, reveals
the restriction is statistically significant (X2 =
14.116, 3 d.j, P e 0.005), This implies that differ-
ent socioeconomic groups maintain different pref-
erences for volunteer pond monitoring.
Subsequently, we include the socioeconomic–
NEITHER POND interaction terms in our final,
fourth specification. 17Specification 4 differs from
specification 2 by excluding the PURPOSE_A
variable. Given that PURPOSE_A remains insig-
nificant in specifications 1, 2, and 3 (P > 0.80), it
does not appear influential in the respondents’ de-
cisions over volunteer pond monitoring; thus, we
drop PURPOSE_A from our final analysis, A com-
parison of specifications 4 and 2 reveals no major
differences in the sign, magnitude, and signifi-
cance of the parameter estimates, except that the
significance of PURPOSE_B improves from a one-
tailed P <0.05 to P <0.001 in specification 4.
The insignificance of PURPOSE_A but signifi-
cance of PURPOSE_B suggests a “catch the pol-
luter(s)” preference among the respondents. Re-
call, the purposes of monitoring Ponds A and B
are, respectively, “to warn of any problems” and
‘‘to help find source of [a] current problem”;
hence, the respondents appear willing to tradeoff
trying to detect any unknown and uncertain prob-
lem(s) for finding the source of a known and cer-
tain problem, Several explanations for this result
may exist. First, the respondents may view the ben-
efits of monitoring Pond A as less certain than the
benefits of monitoring Pond B, A preference for
more certain benefits over less certain benefits re-
mains consistent with Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1979) “prospect theory” and with Macmillan,
Hanley, and Buckland’s (1996) finding that people
IT For our founh specification, we used the Hausman-McFadden test
(Hausman and McFadden 1984; Green 1995, pp. 500-501) to test for
violations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (11A) assump.
tion. The resulting chi-square of 0.66 (P > 0.85) indicates that the 11A
assumption is satisfied and suggests that the current specification repre-
sents the respondents’ decision-making process,
prefer environmental projects with certain gains
over projects with uncertain gains. Second, the re-
spondents may deem a current environmental
problem more important than monitoring to estab-
lish a baseline from which to detect possible future
problems. Indeed, these results suggest that, in the
absence of more information, respondents assumed
monitoring was intended only to detect possible
future problems. While respondents value monitor-
ing services, in general, their value for monitoring
a particular pond increased when monitoring could
identify a current pollution source.
Estimated WTP for Volunteer Water
Quality Monitoring
Following Hanemann (1984), we can obtain a util-
ity-theoretic welfare measure, or willingness-to-
psy, for volunteer pond monitoring. A respon-
dent’s maximum willingness-to-pay, WTP, is cal-
culated as the program cost, C, that will make the
individual indifferent between monitoring the pond
chosen and the status quo (i.e., the neither pond
alternative), which has zero cost. The indifference
between choosing Pond k and the neither pond op-
tion can be represented symbolically as follows:
(8) U(XN> Si)Jfi) = U(xk,Si, ~i - w’Tpk)
for all k # N,
where N denotes the neither pond option, which
has zero cost; k denotes the chosen pond; WTPk
equals the maximum willingness-to-pay for moni-
toring on Pond k; and X, S, and M areas defined in
equation (1). Next, using our empirical utility func-
tion, as in equation (1) with (7a, 7b)–(8), we can
solve for WTPk as follows:
(9) P’
‘Tpk = ‘E ‘Zik -‘iN)’
Estimates of WTP for Ponds A and B can be ob-
tained by using the parameter estimates in table 4.
Table 5 reports WTP estimates for the average
respondent based on equation (9) and the param-
eter estimates for specification 4 (table 4). For
Ponds A and B, hypothetical-money WTP exceeds
real-money WTP by a factor of 4.67.’8 This factor
lies well within the range of factors reported across
the few other discrete choice studies that compare
hypothetical-money and real-money WTP for a
public good (Foster, Bateman, and Harley 1997);
18Beca”se of the linearity in specification 4 (table 4), the ratiO Of
hypothetical-money WTP to reaf-money WTP (for Ponds A and B) re-
duces to a ratio of the REAL COST coefficient (–O.182) to the ffYPO-
7“ETICAL C(XW coefficient (-0,039).40 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 5. Willingness-to-Pay Estimates for the
Average Respondent
Hvuothetical WTP Real-Money WTP
Pond A $42.69 $9.15*
($38.24) ($1.79)
Pond B $63.23 $13.55*
($58.67) ($2.42)
Difference
(WTP, - WTPJ’ $20.54 $4,40**
($21.78) ($1.76)
NOTE:The WTPestimates reported here are based on the pa-
rameter estimates to specification 4 in table 4 and the average
respondent, identified by the sample mean of the variables
WQATTITUDE, GENDER, and ECOLOGY, which are, respec-
tively, 1.6692, 0,4662, and 0.6767. The numbers in parentheses
represent standard errors for the WTP estimates.
‘Given the definition of WTP in equation (9), the difference
(WTP, - WTPJ can be written as (-~’/&-) (Zw- Zti).
*Significant at P-value <0.001 for a one-tailed test of Ho: WTP~
= O versus HA: WTP~ >0.
**Significant at p-value <0.01 for a one-tailed test of Ho: WTf’E
= WTPA versus HA: WTP~ > WTPA.
however, it exceeds the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration’s (1993) suggested cor-
rection factor of 2. This suggests that the average
respondent in our sample may have overstated his/
her WTP for volunteer monitoring in the hypo-
thetical survey. However, because of the high stan-
dard errors on the hypothetical-money WTP esti-
mates, we cannot conclude that these WTP
estimates are statistically greater than the real-
money WTP estimates. 19
Next, given specification 4, a comparison of the
WTP estimates for Ponds A and B reveals how
much the average respondent is willing to pay to
help identify a current pollution source in Pond B,
The average respondent appears willing to pay an
extra $20,54 hypothetical dollars, or $4,40 real dol-
lars, to help find the source of the water clarity
problem in Pond B. The real-money difference is
statistically significant (P t 0,01), while the hypo-
thetical-money difference is not statistically sig-
nificant (P > 0.15), These results suggest, espe-
cially in the real-money surveys, that respondents
19 ~ch s~and~d error in table 5 is based on an estimate of the vtiance
of WTPk Var(WZ’Pk). Here, we followed Kmenta’s (1971, p. 444) ap-
proximation formula based on a Taylor series expansion, as follows:
‘ar(wp’w2”vu(D~ ’+(ia2”var@c)
‘2”(iNi?)c0v(D~c)
where D~ = -~ ‘(Z~k - Zw) and Cov(Dti &) equals the covariarrce be-
tween Dk and PC Note that the elements of Var(WTPk) account for the samp-
le size, through the vasiance-covariance matrix of estimators; in this case,
- is the standard error of WTP,
value monitoring at Ponds A and B equally until
they are informed that monitoring on Pond B will
help identify a current source of pollution. This
information motivated respondents to raise their
WTP by about 48%. Without this information, the
differences between Ponds A and B (table 1), in-
cluding the size, water clarity, and location differ-
ences, left respondents statistically indifferent be-
tween the ponds.
Concluding Remarks
While most economic studies of water quality fo-
cus on estimating the benefits of water quality im-
provements, this paper initiates study of the pref-
erences and willingness-to-pay of individuals for
volunteer water quality monitoring programs. The
paper uses both hypothetical and real payment con-
tingent valuation formats to directly measure indi-
vidual preferences and willingness-to-pay for vol-
unteer ‘monitoring at two ponds in Rhode Island.
An analysis of the contingent valuation survey re-
sponses suggests that our sample of respondents
values pond monitoring regardless of whether a
pond is surrounded by wooded area or housing
development, and that a respondent’s state of resi-
dence plays no significant role in determining the
respondent’s probability of choosing to support
monitoring on one of the Rhode Island ponds.
Factors that appear to influence a respondent’s
decision to support volunteer water quality moni-
toring include (1) the stated purpose of monitoring,
(2) the individual cost of monitoring, (3) the re-
spondent’s attitude toward social responsibility for
water quality, (4) the respondent’s gender, and (5)
the respondent’s academic major. The respondents
appear willing to tradeoff monitoring “to warn of
any problems” (as in Pond A) in exchange for
monitoring “to help find [the] source of current
problem” (as in Pond B). In terms of WTP, the
average respondent values the two ponds equally
when information on the purpose of monitoring is
not given; however, the average respondent is ac-
tually willing to pay 4890 more in real money to
monitor a pond for the purpose of helping identify
the source of current water quality problems. This
may reflect a preference for more tangible/certain
environmental gains, an ethical preference to catch
the polluter(s), or a higher concern for ponds with
CtItTHU moblems.
In te~s of the socioeconomic characteristics of
the student-respondents, those who believe every-
one is responsible for water quality, females, and
ecology/environmental majors are more likely to
support pond monitoring, The ecology/environ-Spencer, Swallow, and Miller Valuing Waler Quality Monitoring 41
mental major effect suggests that monitoring pro-
grams might obtain more public support if envi-
ronmental agencies better educate the public about
the importance of water quality monitoring.
Overall, water quality monitoring is a key ele-
ment in efforts to protect water resources, and
states are finding that volunteer monitoring pro-
grams are a cost-effective way to obtain credible
information on water quality, In Rhode Island, vol-
unteer water quality monitoring data aids environ-
mental managers to set priorities for various man-
agement or enforcement actions for watersheds
and water bodies. Supplementing monitoring data
with information on public preferences and WTP
could help environmental managers identify the
water body types that both the public and water
resource specialists consider important and worthy
of investment.
To accomplish this task, future research might
investigate a two-stage process for setting priori-
ties for monitoring and management actions for
water bodies. The first stage would involve water
resource specialists using monitoring data and
other scientific information to identify environ-
mentally important water body types. In the second
stage, environmental economists could use the
first-stage results to build a model of public pref-
erences for water quality monitoring on various
water body types. Based on information from both
steps, environmental managers could identify a list
of water bodies that better satisfies the preferences
of both water resource specialists and the public.
Lastly, environmental economists may gain in-
sights from this case application comparing hypo-
thetical-money and real-money contingent valua-
tion surveys. For our sample of respondents, hy-
pothetical-money costs are less influential than
real-money costs in determining a respondent’s
probability of choosing to support monitoring on
one of the ponds. The present study used a split-
sample design wherein respondents in each sample
received either a hypothetical-money or a real-
money survey, but the actual differences between
the surveys were quite minimal. This design im-
plied that the hypothetical survey contained exten-
sive details concerning how money would have
been collected and, if necessary, refunded if real
money had actually been solicited from the respon-
dents. Further research might involve comparing
real-money surveys with two versions of the hy-
pothetical survey, wherein the additional hypo-
thetical survey follows a more traditional, and
briefer, format for the payment vehicle, such as
payments of hypothetical new taxes. Without such
additional research, and especially in light of our
statistical tests, we believe it is premature to con-
clude that hypothetical and real contingent vahta-
tion estimates of WTP necessarily will differ by
the factor of four obtained here.
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